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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Several factors can increase or decrease military-economic
involvement in communist regimes. This anomalous form of
military behavior, labeled as the Military Business Complex
(MBC), emerged in various communist regimes in the 1980s.
However, in the early 2000s, the communist governments of
China and Vietnam began to decrease the number of
military-managed industries, while similar industries
increased in Cuba. This paper explains why military
industries in Cuba have increased over the last two decades,
while they decreased in the Chinese and Vietnamese
examples. This question is answered by comparatively
testing two hypotheses: the Communist Party and the
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) Hypotheses.
The Communist Party hypothesis helps explain how the
historical and current structures of Party oversight of the
military have been lacking in strength and reliability in
Cuba, while they traditionally have been more robust in
China and Vietnam. The BA hypothesis helps explain how,
due to the lack of a strong civilian institutional oversight, the
Cuban military has grown into a bureaucratic entity with
many political officers holding autonomous positions of
power, an outcome that is not prevalent in the Chinese and
Vietnamese examples. Thus, with the establishment of a
bureaucratic military government and with the absence of
strong party oversight, the Cuban military has been able to
protect its economic endeavors while the Chinese and
Vietnamese MBC regimes have contracted.
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INTRODUCTION
The Military Business Complex model (MBC) places the
military apparatus in charge of economic and business
dealings on behalf of the civilian communist authority. The
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in an
MBC regime between 1978 and 1998. This included
important businesses such as the Sanju (999) Enterprises
Group, which began as a pharmaceutical orientedconglomerate but in the early 1990s expanded into real
estate, investments and electronics, and the China Xinxing
Group Corporation which specialized in many production
industries such as civilian clothing and accessories.1 It was
not until 1998 that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
under the presidency of Jiang Zemin officially announced
the end of PLA economic financing, dismantling the bulk of
the Chinese MBC and its industries from 20,000 enterprises
to a mere shadow of less than 1,000 units.2
The Vietnamese MBC regime, which was established in
1986 by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), consisted
of more than 300 enterprises in the 1990s and was managed
by the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA). These included
businesses such as the Truong Son General Construction
Corporation, which concentrated, in addition to construction
projects, on transportation of exported and imported goods,
and the VPA Special Operations Branch which took part in
the mining and gem production business.3 Most of these
industries shrunk in size as the Vietnamese MBC was
reduced to less than 200 economic units by the early 2000s.
1

James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese
Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998 (New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
2001), 113, 128-129.
2
James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune.
3
Carlyle A. Thayer, The Vietnamese People’s Army Under Doi Moi
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1994).
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In contrast to the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC experiences,
the Cuban MBC regime is still in place and has grown in
operation since the early 2000s. The Cuban Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR) managed between 100 to 250
economic units and industries in the early 1990s. This
number increased to 1,400 businesses by 2006.4 Among
them, the all important Gaviota S.A., which provides
services for tourists, and Copextel S.A. which helps produce
electronic appliances for local use.
The purpose of this paper is to examine why the Cuban MBC
has continued to expand, while the Chinese and Vietnamese
MBC regimes have ceased or reduced their economic
involvements.5 It presents the two hypotheses that are
discussed as possible explanations to the research question. It
also reviews the data on how each of the hypotheses relates
to the three MBC case studies. Finally, it summarizes the
outcomes for each case study and offers a conclusion.
VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
Communist Party Variable and Hypothesis 1 (H1)
The ability of the central communist party to maintain
control over the military is a crucial factor that determines
the fate of the MBC regime. Various scholars, however,
argue that communist-socialist regimes do not have clear
Hal Klepak, Cuba’s Military 1990-2005: Revolutionary Soldiers
During Counter-Revolutionary Times (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2005).
5
This paper answers the research question by looking into the two
underlined hypotheses. It presents information and data related to the
differences in party oversight structure over the military, and the
differences in military political appointees and delegation of power in
each of the case studies. It should be noted that this paper does not take
an in depth analysis of the MBC regimes themselves, but merely presents
how two hypotheses can explain the discrepancies documented with each
of the three MBC case studies.
4

3

distinctions between civilian and military institutions, as may
be the case in democratic governments such as, the United
States and the European Union.6 This is so because the
armed forces in communist societies are normally active in
the political affairs of the local communist party and vice
versa. This is not to suggest that there is an absence of areas
where a distinction can be made between party and military,
but it can be difficult for a researcher to distinguish between
the two and determine which one is more influential.7 For
this reason, this study takes into account two control factors
that are stated to be crucial for a totalitarian authority to
oversee and maintain a subordinated military.
Samuel P. Huntington points to the first factor in his
explanation of the term Subjective Civilian Control of the
military. Subjective control over the military is when a
civilian faction maximizes its power over the military by not
allowing the establishment of an autonomous military sphere
of interest.8 Huntington argues that in this type of civilian
control in totalitarian regimes rely on interior security
ministries, or other control instruments, to maintain or coerce
the armed forces into a subordinate role. In this study these
control institutions are analyzed for their strength and
influence within all three MBC regimes.
Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande present the second
factor in the form of “historical legitimacy” within the
communist party, arguing that the armed forces stay loyal
and subordinate to the local communist party by respecting
6

Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform:
Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political
Systems,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 76, No. 4 (1982),
778-89.
7
Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform.”
8
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and
Politics of Civil- Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957), 84-85.
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its historical legitimacy in society.9 They argue that it is
important for communist party apparatuses to begin building
their legitimacy during the time of their formations, which in
many socialist regimes occurred through violent uprising and
revolution. During the time of “national revolution,” the
communist party organization builds a mutually beneficial
relationship with the armed forces, and establishes itself as
the leading organizing entity. As such, by the time of
“revolutionary triumph,” the armed forces see the party as
the legitimate government.10 Based on this criterion, the
current investigation conducts a historical analysis of the
times during which the respective three communist parties
were established by their party founder, therefore bearing
evidence on how well each communist party institution was
able to bring legitimacy on its armed forces. Since this
historical contrast is derived by Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s
arguments, Huntington’s criteria of oversight ministries and
institutions is also taken into account in this section. Thus,
the hypothesis reads as follows: If the Cuban communist
central authority does not have institutional control over the
FAR, and the Chinese and Vietnamese party authorities do
have control over the PLA and VPA institutions, then this
variable can account for the discrepancies witnessed in the
MBC regimes.
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Variable and Hypothesis 2
(H2)
The bureaucratic-authoritarian hypothesis is based on a
different notion than the communist party hypothesis. It
encompasses the possibility that some of the MBC countries
are adapting qualities that go beyond the traditional MBC
model, and can be more accurately explained with an
alternative model on military praetorian activity. The
alternative model that is analyzed is the Bureaucratic9

Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” 786.
Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” 786.
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Authoritarian (BA) model that was applied to various South
American military junta governments during the 1960s and
1970s.
A key element in the BA model is that the military becomes
the central governing institution by having many military
officers holding delegated positions of power while not
dependent on the authority of a single individual.11 The BA
form of military governance stands apart from other types of
military rule because of its decentralized nature. For the
purpose of this study, the BA variable is defined as a
bureaucratic military leadership, consisting of many military
officers holding autonomous positions of power and
authority.
The analysis of this variable and hypothesis is done by
observing the governing leadership structures of the selected
case studies during the time of MBC regime existence. This
involves identifying the key decision-makers of each
country, and presenting the institutions and delegates
involved in carrying out economic and political policies. An
analysis of political leaders and their delegations of authority
validates whether there is a delegation of power to civilian or
military officers, and accounts for officers who take active
decision-making within the economic and political sectors.
Thus, the hypothesis stipulates that if prominent FAR
military officials hold independent institutional positions of
leadership, and such military elites are absent in the PLA and
VPA cases, this variable might explain the outcomes
observed in MBC regimes.

11

David Collier, “The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and
Priorities for Future Research,” in The New Authoritarianism in Latin
America, edited by David Collier, 363-97 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979), 368.
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CHINESE MBC
Communist Party Variable
The PLA and the CCP were both created in 1927 under the
communist leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Mao acted as
supreme leader for both institutions, establishing party
legitimacy within the armed forces and military obedience to
his charismatic decision-making.12 By the late 1920s, Mao
established the political commissar system. Party officers
began to accompany PLA units and ensure party doctrine in
military decision-making. However, this triggered resistance
by field commanders who were fighting the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) forces in central and eastern China
during the 1930s. Their main argument was that civilian
political officers were interfering with decision-making in
the PLA chain of command. The political officer system was
removed in 1936, and Chairman Mao ensured that all
political and military decisions passed through him
personally. His authority was formally institutionalized in
1951 with the creation of the Central Military Commission
(CMC) under the leadership of the CCP.13
The party commissar system was re-introduced in 1958 due
to cases of criticism from PLA generals and officers. The reintroduction of the commissar system installed political
commissars on all branches of the PLA, including the Air
Force, Navy and regular Army units. The system was later
partially removed in 1976, yet the need for reliable oversight
of the PLA was not eliminated. A system of party secretaries
12

Ellis Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics: Factors and
Phases,” in Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the
People’s Liberation Army, edited by Nan Li, 7-22 (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006), 13.
13
You Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” in
Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s
Liberation Army, edited by Nan Li (London and New York: Routledge,
2006), 80-106.
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was installed under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping in
1985. Party secretaries were known to report on PLA actions
and decision-making to the leadership of the CCP. However,
they did not have the authority granted to political
commissars on actively overruling PLA officers and their
decisions. Authority for overruling military decisions was
reserved for Chinese leader Deng, the CMC, and by party
member vote in the Central Committee of the CCP.14
In 1993, President Jiang Zemin, a civilian official, began to
enforce party secretaries at the provincial level by giving
them the status of political officers. The new batch of
commissars was composed of civilian and military
personnel, ensuring active participation of political
commissars and secretaries answerable to the CMC and
preferentially acceptable to both CCP and PLA interests.15
Such a network of civilian oversight has been prevalent in
Chinese party-military relations ever since.
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule)
The communist government of China historically has been
led by four prominent leaders. The leadership under Mao
Tse-tung lasted from 1927 to his death in 1976, and involved
a central form of leadership where Mao was considered head
of the party and the military, with little or no criticism by
PLA officers.16 For example, the re-installation of the
political commissar system in 1956 and the removal of
Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai in 1958 were both
accepted by the PLA with limited criticism.17 Mao was also
hesitant in delegating authority to any of his subordinates,
and he constantly warned over having too much bureaucracy

14

Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars.”
Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” 94-95.
16
Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics.”
17
Ibid. 13.
15
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and decentralization of power.18 He did possess an entourage
of trusted advisors whom he appointed to various positions
within the CCP and the CMC. By serving as chairman of
both the CCP and the CMC, Mao ensured that his network of
advisors would keep him updated on all PLA decisions, thus
ensuring his centrality in both institutions with limited
delegated authority.19
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, also employed a network
of party and military advisors that ensured his leadership,
most notably CMC Vice-Chair Yang Shangkun. Deng was
able to solidify his power between 1976 and 1978 by purging
the pro-Maoist “Gang of Four” and Mao’s former wife Jiang
Qing.20 Like Mao, Deng was also considered a centralist
military authority and all major decisions were enacted by
him with little delegation of authority. Advisors such as
Yang helped to ensure his rule in the PLA institution, yet
Deng was considered the sole authority during his time in
power and the PLA officer’s core remained overall loyal to
his persona despite criticism by some military officers when
he ordered the PLA to begin its business endeavors in the
early 1980s.21
Deng’s leadership lasted until 1994, when he disappeared
from public life. Jiang Zemin, former chairman of the
18

Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet,
Political Handbook of the World 2008. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press,
2008).
19
Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” 13-14.
20
Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008, 249-250.
21
James Mulvenon argues that in the 1980s, Deng began to institute
economic reforms, saving costs on the central national budget. These
new economic policies included severely diminishing the national
defense budget and cutting the number of active regular PLA troops. To
offset the diminishing defense budget, Deng ordered the PLA to increase
their economic activities, thus ushering in the beginning of the Chinese
MBC (2001).
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CMC,22 was named as his successor. Jiang’s rise to power in
the mid-1990s symbolized a shift in Chinese leadership and
military management. Apart from Mao and Deng, who had
strong roots within the PLA, Jiang was a civilian leader with
no military experience and limited charismatic appeal. His
leadership strengthened institutions, such as the CCP and the
CMC, instead of falling back on charismatic legitimacy
evident in his two predecessors,23 This was done by
replacing older civilian and military officers who were
deemed by Jiang as too independent and threatening to his
rule with younger officials that supported his rule.24
Jiang’s policies were then followed by President Hu Jintao in
the early 2000s. Hu was also a civilian party official with
limited military legitimacy, and relied on strong institutions
to ensure his rule. This included replacing pro-Jiang civilian
and military officials with those more loyal to him, a move
that eventually lead to the removal of former President
Jiang25 in 2005 from the CMC chairman position, a position
that Hu then took for himself.26
Presidents Hu and Jiang were not the central charismatic
leaders seen in Mao and Deng. They were more bureaucratic
in nature, as both of them relied on institutional strength
from the CCP and the CMC. Yet, none of these four leaders,
including Mao and Deng, delegated authority to military
22

Jiang was the first known civilian chair of the CMC. He obtained such
a position when Deng Xiaoping relinquished his formal title of Chair of
the CMC. After which, Deng possessed informal rule of the CMC, and
was still recognized as China’s supreme leader (Banks et al., Political
Handbook of the World 2008, 252)
23
Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics,” 15-17.
24
Ibid. 100.
25
President Jiang retained his post of chairman of the CMC after he
relinquished the presidency in the year 2003 (Joffe, “The Chinese Army
in Domestic Politics,” 16-17).
26
Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics,” 17.
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leaders to the point seen in BA regimes. They each possessed
their circle of advisors and in the case of Presidents Hu and
Jiang, a decentralization of institutional authority did occur,
seen in the empowered institutions of the CCP and the
CMC.27 Yet, these examples are based more on a civilian
bureaucratic authority, and do not match the BA regime form
of military delegate authority.
THE VIETNAMESE MBC
Communist Party Variable
The VPA was created in 1944 by party leader Ho Chi Minh
as a parallel institution to the Indochinese Communist Party
(ICP). Ho saw the need to train and rally Vietnamese
nationalists to help unify the nation, which would contend
with Japanese imperialism in the 1940s and French
colonialism in the 1950s. It was first composed of
approximately 500 fighters in 1945, but grew to more than
10,000 troops by the mid-1950s.28
The Vietnamese Communist Party first began as the ICP in
1944 under Ho’s leadership. It was then renamed the
Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) in 1954 and then the
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 1976 as the official
government party of the newly unified Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (SRV).29 During its initial years, the party mostly
followed the decisions employed by leader Ho. Ho
surrounded himself with individuals who had dual roles in
forming the communist party apparatus and the Vietnamese
military institution. These dual role personnel ensured
27

Ibid.
Thaveeporn Vasavakul,“Vietnam: From Revolutionary Heroes to Red
Entrepreneurs,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political
Role of the Military in South Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 336-56.
29
Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008, 1477.
28
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parallel military and party compliance, as well as party
historical legitimacy over the armed forces. Ho’s early
proclamation in 1944 of the Vietnamese revolution as a
socialist revolution under the leadership of the ICP also
ensured party historical legitimacy in the VPA military
institution.30
After defeating France in the 1950s and the U.S. in the
1970s, certain institutions were installed to help manage the
VPA, which by then was composed of almost 2 million
soldiers. The Central Military Party Committee (CMPC) was
established in 1985 and was the latest institution of a long
line of preceding party institutions.31 The CMPC was the
main liaison institution that ensured party commissars within
the VPA followed party decisions and policies. It also kept
tabs and records of military personnel that were party
members to enforce party compliance by military officials.32
The CMPC mandate was later expanded to include oversight
of the Vietnamese MBC. It enforced two separate party
reforms which led to the gradual diminishment of the
Vietnamese MBC, and were severely criticized by VPA
military leaders.33
The Vietnamese party oversight system has kept strong
controls on the VPA military apparatus; however, this
system has not exempted the VCP from military criticism.
Various VPA generals and officers, including former
Secretary Lt. General Le Kha Phieu, openly criticized the
party in the preceding months of the 1996 party congress. In
30

Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 341.
Ibid.
32
Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 341-344.
33
Carlyle Thayer, “The Economic and Commercial Roles of the
Vietnamese People’s Army,” in The Military as an Economic Actor,
edited by Jorn Brommelhorster, and Wolf-Christian Paes, 74-93 (New
York: Palgrave, 2003), 89-92.
31
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his address over the Hanoi National Radio Network,
Secretary Le openly stated that the VCP needed to increase
training of raw young recruits within the armed forces. He
also criticized the party for failing to make industrialization
and economic modernization more of a national priority in
the 1990s.34 General Dao Dinh Luyen, a long-standing
member of the Party Military Committee, also criticized the
party. Dao stated that the VCP was failing to meet the
requirements needed to improve industrialization,
technological advancement and national defense.35
The Vietnamese military institution has at times openly
criticized the local communist authority, yet these acts of
resistance have been limited. History shows that the VPA
has been unable to prevent party action in containing
independent military decision-making. An example of this is
seen with the removal of Lt. General Le Kha Phieu as party
secretary in the early 2000, which was criticized but
otherwise accepted by the VPA leadership.36
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule)
As established, the VCP was formed in 1944 as the
Indochinese Communist Party by Ho Chi Minh and his circle
of civilian and military leaders. All of these individuals
played a part in carrying out party and military policy, yet
the central authority figure that governed the Vietnamese
nation was the charismatic party leader Ho Chi Minh.37 Ho
was the founder of the ICP and the Vietminh socialist

34

Lewis Stern, The Vietnamese Communist Party’s Agenda for Reform:
A Study of the Eight National Party Congress (London: McFarland &
Company, Inc, Publishers, 1998), 41.
35
Ibid., 42.
36
Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 351.
37
Ibid.
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movement, and all party and military authority was centered
on his persona with limited delegation of power.38
Ho’s death in 1969 brought the de facto-leadership of
General Secretary Le Duan39 until the formation of the SRV
in 1976, which then brought the authority of President Ton
Duc Thang as the official leader of the SRV.40 Vietnam came
under the rule of various leaders after President Ton’s death
in 1980, yet the SRV was basically run by the VCP. The
presidents and political leaders that came after 1980,
Presidents Nguyen Huu Tho, Trung Chinh and Vo Chi Cong,
were all characterized as non-charismatic and non-military
leaders. These leaders mainly focused on strengthening the
bureaucracy of the VCP, which included the formation of the
CMPC in 1985. Consequently, during the time of these
presidencies, Vietnamese governance was carried out by the
party and civilian institutions with little or no delegation of
power to military officers.
It was not until 1992 that Vietnam came under the
presidency of its first military leader, retired General Le Duc
Anh. Up to this point Vietnam was mainly ruled by the VCP
and its civilian institutions.41 The Vietnamese MBC first
began to take hold in 1986, yet it was under President Le’s
leadership that it grew to more than 300 industries. Under
Le’s presidency, the most prominent military member that
rose to a high position of power was Lt. General Le Kha
Phieu. General Le was named as Party Secretary and was
one of the strongest supporters of increasing the Vietnamese
MBC. Yet after President Le Duc Anh resigned in 1997,
38

Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008,1478-1479.
The post of President and Party Leader was left vacant until 1976 as a
sign of respect to Ho Chi Minh’s leadership (Banks et al., Political
Handbook of the World 2008, 1478).
40
Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008.
41
Banks, et al. Political Handbook of the World 2008.
39
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General Le was eventually removed from office in 2001 and
Vietnam was again under civilian rule.42 The only
resemblance of BA model military authority was with the
tenure of both of these officers between 1992 and 2001. Yet
these two examples of military decentralized leadership
within the Vietnamese MBC do not conform to the BA
variable definition of multiple military officers holding
autonomous positions of power. Furthermore, even during
the time of military President Le Duc Anh, Vietnam was still
centrally governed by the civilian communist party, and the
appointments of these two officers did not stop the two
economic reforms that were enacted by the CMPC in 1995
and 1997 to gradually reduce the Vietnamese MBC.
CUBAN MBC
Communist Party Variable
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) was officially created in
1965, but according to LeoGrande, was not considered a
strong reliable governing organization until the early 1970s.
The FAR was created in 1961, yet its personnel and staff
were already organized under the leadership of Fidel and
Raúl Castro in 1957. This lapse of time ensured a party
military spectrum that consisted of a newly created
communist party organization contending with an already
established legitimate military institution.43
In 1961, then President Fidel Castro ordered the creation of
the Central School of Revolutionary Instructors. It was
created to train a set of instructors to help politically educate
FAR military units, a move that was part of Fidel Castro’s
42

Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 351-352.
William M. LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military
Relations in Communist Political Systems: The Case of Cuba,” in CivilMilitary Relations in Communist Systems, edited by Dale R. Herspring
and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 201-18.
43
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pronouncement of the Cuban revolution as a socialist
revolution. With this pronouncement, Fidel saw the need to
make sure that the military remained loyal to his regime.
Between the years of 1959-1962, the only mechanism of
civilian control over the military was the loyalty of the FAR
forces to Castro himself,44 and the counterweight offered by
the National Revolutionary Militias composed of irregular
civilians.45 Yet, the establishment of revolutionary
instructors, who were later referred to as political instructors,
offered the Castro leadership a more sophisticated institution
to maintain civilian control of the FAR.
By 1963, the drawbacks and overall failures of installing
political controls on the FAR became evident. Cuban
military officers immediately criticized the use of political
officers, arguing that they did not have any knowledge or
experience in military governing methods and were an
impediment in military fighting effectiveness. With the Bay
of Pigs Invasion (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962),
the Castro leadership appeased FAR officers by restructuring
the training parameters of political officers. Consequently,
from 1963 to 1970, political officers were strictly limited to
act as a supportive role to the military. This included taking
direct orders from FAR officers in their respective military
units.46

44

Edward Gonzáles documents this charismatic element with his
Fidelismo model, which presents a charismatic leader holding complete
central authority in every single component of governance, as such not
relying on any decentralized bureaucratic political institution (Edward
Gonzáles, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Los Angeles:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 218-221.
45
LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in
Communist Political Systems,” 206.
46
LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in
Communist Political Systems,” 207-210.
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A similar outcome occurred with the creation of the PCC in
1965. Military officers believed that such bureaucratic
intervention would impede the FAR’s administrative
mandate. Such conflict of interest was voiced by then
Minister of Defense Raúl Castro in 1966, who eventually
proclaimed that there was widespread resistance by FAR
officers in accepting PCC command. Because of favoritism,
and the overall prestige of the military, the PCC was
unofficially recognized as a supportive arm and tool of the
FAR during the formative years, between 1965 and 1970.47
During this time, as the inner departments of the PCC were
organized and consolidated, FAR officers held almost
complete decision-making in selecting party central
committee members; moreover, criticism of FAR officers by
party members was completely banned during party
meetings. Thus, in the formative years of the PCC, the
Cuban communist party was completely subordinated to the
FAR military institution.48
It was not until the 1970s that the PCC began to increase its
control and influence as a governing institution, in large part
due to the political pressure from the Soviet Union on the
Castro leadership and the overall failure of the 10 million
tons grain harvest to live up to expectations under the mostly
military-administrated economic policies. By 1974, the FAR
position of privilege in non-military tasks was decreasing,
and the Cuban party-military spectrum began to resemble the
typical communist regimes seen in Russia, Asia and Eastern
Europe. However, they quickly reverted back to a similar
scenario of the 1960s as a reaction to the emerging
Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, and the eventual collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1989.49 In the 1990s, the Castro
47

Ibid.
Ibid.
49
Juan Carlos Espinosa, “Vanguard of the State: The Cuban Armed
Forces in Transition,” in Cuban Communism: 1959-2003, edited by
48
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regime augmented the FAR’s hold on power by increasing
its economic and political influence by transferring economic
and political institutions from PCC jurisdiction to FAR
management.50
The most famous case regarding the transfer of power
occurred with the Ministry of Interior (MININT), the main
domestic security institution in Cuba.51 In 1989, with the
sacking of MININT director José Abrantes, FAR General
Abelardo Ibarra became head Minister of MININT. This led
to a change in MININT’s operations and procedures,
including FAR participation in security decision-making,
inability to investigate FAR officers without prior military
approval, and stationing of FAR personnel in security tasks
such as interrogations, drug enforcement and crime
investigations.52 The one institution that could have offered
oversight to the FAR began to be heavily hindered in
military oversight operations.53
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule)
Since 1959 the Cuban leadership structure has always been
centered on Fidel and Raúl Castro. As was the case with
Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1949 China and party leader Ho
Chi Minh in 1965 Vietnam, Fidel Castro proclaimed himself
as the sole charismatic decision-maker. According to
Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki (New Brunswick and
London: Transaction Publishers, 2003) 366-87.
50
Ibid.
51
Brian Latell, After Fidel: Raul Castro and the Future of Cuba’s
Revolution (New York: Palgrave, 2005).
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interviews from defected Cuban officials, Fidel himself
admitted his deep antipathy for bureaucracies and committee
forms of government. He was known to have an inner circle
of ten civilian and military advisors, which he would use to
obtain advice and recommendation and then make his final
decision with no delegation of authority.54 This was the main
characterization of Cuban governance from 1959 to 2006.
Raúl Castro, in contrast to his brother, is considered to lack
charisma, assertiveness and prestige within the Cuban
context.55 As such, Raúl’s leadership has been characterized
as delegating power to loyal military officers from his time
as Minister of Defense. Such officers include General
Ramiro Valdés56 who was former head of the Ministry of
Interior in the 1960s and now heads FAR Corporation
Copextel S.A, former Minister of Defense General Julio
Casas Regueiro who up to his death in 2011, was a key
player in managing the all important GAESA S.A.
organization, and finally General Abelardo Ibarra, who
currently heads the Ministry of Interior and is considered one
of Raul’s trusted colleagues.57
Other important FAR appointments to government ministries
include General Ulises Rosales del Toro, head of the
Ministry of Sugar Industry, Colonel Manuel Marrero, head
of the Ministry of Tourism, General Carlos Fernández
Gondin, head of the FAR counterintelligence and vice
minister of MININT, Colonel Álvaro Pérez Morales, former
head of Ministry of Transport and Ports, and Colonel
54
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Orlando Rodríguez Romay, former head of Ministry of
Fisheries and Merchant Marine.58 These appointments
represent the independent military-political element within
the Cuban government. This institutional form of military
economic and political management is an evolving
phenomenon that closely resembles the appointments and
delegations of power seen in BA regimes.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Communist Party Analysis
According to Huntington, Perlmutter and LeoGrande,
totalitarian states ensure civilian control with their governing
historical legitimacy, and with the use of security institutions
to influence military decision making. The Chinese and
Vietnamese communist institutions were both created on a
parallel platform with their armed forces, and they both were
given executive rights, through their charismatic party
founders, to oversee their respective military institutions.
Apart from isolated cases of military personnel criticizing
party governance, the Chinese and Vietnamese military
institutions as a whole recognized and followed orders early
on from their respective communist parties.59 Thus, both the
Chinese and Vietnamese party organizations possess
historical legitimacy within their party-military spectrums.
The Cuban case presents a different example, where the FAR
military institution predates the PCC by several years. The
FAR was the main working institution in the 1960s, and was
the main managerial agent that took charge of rebuilding
Cuban society after the revolutionary war of 1957-1959.60
58

Domingo Amuchástegui, “FAR: Mastering Reform,” Cuba in
Transition, Vol. 10 (2000), 433-41.
59
Thayer, “The Economic and Commercial Roles of the Vietnamese
People’s Army.”
60
Espinosa, “Vanguard of the State.”

20

By the time the PCC was created in 1965, it had to contend
with an established military governing regime, which
severely limited historical party legitimacy. Lack of
historical legitimacy is clearly seen as FAR commanders had
almost complete authority to control party committee
membership, party schedule and meetings, and inner
investigations on FAR personnel.61 Hence, the Cuban case
study does not follow with Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s
argument of historical legitimacy.
The argument of security institutions is also a fact to explain
in this analysis. During and after the initial years of socialist
revolution, the CCP and the VCP installed a network of
oversight institutions on the PLA and VPA military
establishments. Despite initial resistance by army officers in
the 1930s, the CCP installed a dual system of political
commissars and political secretaries who answered to the
Chinese president, the CCP, and the CMC institution. It was
this institutional network that enabled the diminishment of
the PLA economic involvement in 1998.62 The Vietnamese,
likewise, installed a similar chain of institutions which
specifically answered to the CMPC. The institutional rule of
the VCP and the CMPC ensured two waves of reforms in the
Vietnamese MBC, which resulted in its diminishment.
In the Cuban example, the attempt at installing political
officers in the ranks of the FAR was met with overall failure
in the 1960s. Despite the success by the PCC after 1974 in
becoming a legitimate institution, the economic crisis of the
1980s and 1990s led the FAR to once again act as a power
broker above the PCC. Party weakness in overseeing the
FAR also became evident when the Ministry of Interior was
61
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transferred to military jurisdiction in 1989, preventing strong
party oversight on the Cuban armed forces.63
The Chinese and Vietnamese case studies meet Huntington’s
benchmark of security oversight institutions as these two
communist parties maintained control of their respective
militaries. The Cuban example, however, does not meet this
argument on the grounds that the FAR has historically
overruled PCC control, and presently controls the main
security institution that could offer party oversight. Thus, the
Cuban party-military spectrum does not meet either the
Huntington, or the Perlmutter and LeoGrande benchmark
points used to determine the level of party control over the
military. As such, the communist party hypothesis fits the
comparative model underlined in this study, as being a
possible reason for the research question.
BA Model – Military Institutional Rule Analysis
One of the prime BA characteristics is that power and
decision-making are spread out and decentralized across a
wide range of military actors.64 The Chinese MBC began
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a legitimate PLA
figure and rival to Mao Tse-tung. Deng was the official chair
of the CMC from 1978-1989. He took active decision
making in the CMC and CCP, and relied on the presence of
loyalist such as Yang Shangkun to ensure his authority
within the all government institutions.65 In the Vietnamese
case, military President Le Duc Anh and the appointment of
Lt. General Le Kha Phieu as Party Secretary ensured a
limited bureaucratic presence of military interest. Le was
known to have his own sphere of authority during his time as
party secretary.66 Yet, these examples of Vietnamese and
63
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Chinese military delegation of authority are limited. They do
not compare to the various military appointees seen in the
Cuban examples, which involved many high-level FAR
generals obtaining political positions, in addition to
economic assignments. These included, for example, key
sectors such as domestic security (Ministry of Interior),
agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture) and tourism (Ministry
of Tourism). Thus, the BA hypothesis is a prime reason for
as to why the Cuban MBC is able to expand in contrast to the
Chinese’s and Vietnamese’s MBC contractions.
CONCLUSION
The overall conclusion of this study is that the Cuban MBC
has increased because the FAR is gradually becoming the
most prominent institution to manage the Cuban economy
and government. The Chinese and Vietnamese MBC regimes
have decreased mostly because both the PLA and the VPA
have to contend and coexist with an equally strong and
influential party apparatus that limits the economic spheres
of military interest. The FAR does not contend as much with
a party apparatus, but influences and uses the party as a
political tool.
It is important to understand that the communist party and
BA hypotheses are interconnected. The fact that the Cuban
Communist Party does not possess a reliable oversight
mechanism over the FAR is a clear catalyst for the rise of
FAR generals to key government positions. The rise of a
bureaucratic FAR institution is then a result of a power
vacuum left by an underdevelopment of party institutions.
This argument is comparatively corroborated by looking at
the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC counterparts, which
possess a heavy involvement of party institutions, such as the
Chinese CMC and the Vietnamese CMPC, and prevent
complete independence by military officers. The fact that the
23

Ministry of Interior, the strongest Cuban institution capable
of overseeing the Cuban MBC, was shifted to FAR
jurisdiction in 1989 suggests that coordinated civilian
oversight over the military enterprises is non-existent.
It must be clarified that this study does not conclude that the
Chinese and Vietnamese militaries are completely
subservient to general party authority. One must recall the
historical cases of military resistance and criticism of party
leaders in both of these countries. Many scholars label this as
“Conditional Compliance” within communist regimes.67
Communist parties will respect military autonomous spheres
of interest in which the military is more equipped and
capable to handle: i.e. national defense and domestic
security. In return, the military will respect party, and
ultimately civilian, fields of interests such as economic and
social development. This form of party-military relation is
evident in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples, which
consist of the communist party and the military
simultaneously competing and coexisting with one another.68
Such a relation is not evident in the Cuban example, as the
communist party acts as the supportive tool for the military.
These are the scenarios that have emerged in the three case
studies, and may explain why military-economic
involvements expand and contract. When there is a rival
civilian institution that can offer oversight over the military,
then military-economic involvement will probably decrease
or hold stagnant. However, a gap in civilian control over the
military coupled with a legitimate bureaucratic military
entity can lead to an increase in military-economic
involvement.
67
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This can help present a clearer picture and understanding of
the domestic and foreign policy decisions enacted by
regimes that possess highly influential economic-military
institution.
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